THE RORT · MEDIA OWNERSHIP · ARTICLE 7 / 7READING
CASE FILE · MEDIA OWNERSHIPARTICLE 7 / 7By The Rort · September 2026 · therort.com.au

The levy that was designed to raise nothing

The scheme's own stated intent was that government would collect no net revenue at all, with any proceeds returned in full to newsrooms. By early August, reporting on the government's position had the revised levy still expected to raise…

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THE RORT STANDARDPublished before 1.0
THE NEWS BARGAINING INCENTIVEThe levy that was designed to raise nothingPROCEEDS RETURNED IN FULL TO THE NEWS SECTOR, NOT KEPT AS REVENUEas introduced, 13 Aug 20261. THE CHARGE2.75%of Australian digital adrevenue above A$250m2. OFFSET BY DEALS8 dealsneeded for a full offsetfour, then six, then eight3. EXCLUDED FROM IT0the charge on a serviceanswering with an LLM only5%of scheme proceedsearmarked for the AAP20%loading for regional andsmall-outlet journalists25%cap on any one deal'sshare of the offset27 Aug2026: commencement,the day after assentThe scheme's own design intent was that government would collect norevenue from it. By August 2026 the government said the loosenedsettings would still raise a similar amount.NEWS BARGAINING INCENTIVE · ASSENTED 26 AUGUST 2026THERORT.COM.AU
The scheme was designed to collect nothing. By early August, reporting on the government's position had the revised levy still expected to raise a similar amount.

The media ownership series closed in March 2026. Five months later, the piece of media policy that actually became law was not a reform of who owns a masthead, but a charge on the platforms that carry, or refuse to carry, Australian news. The News Bargaining Incentive was announced on 12 December 2024, built to close a specific gap: the 2021 News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code produced more than 30 commercial deals between Google, Meta and Australian news businesses, but it could only ever reach a platform that carried news on its service at all. A platform that withdrew news entirely sat outside it.

The new scheme was designed, on paper, to collect nothing. Treasury's own November 2025 consultation paper states plainly that the intention of the incentive is that the government will collect no revenue from it: a platform that struck enough deals with news businesses could offset its charge down to zero. What moved, repeatedly, over the following nine months, was the price of not doing that: the charge rate, the number of deals required to reach a full offset, and how much of the bill any single deal could wipe out.

By Royal Assent on 26 August 2026, the rate had risen twice and the offset had been made harder to reach in full. Before assent, the government's own framing had already shifted too, from an incentive built to raise nothing to one it said would still raise a similar amount to the design it replaced. This is the postscript the series did not have when it closed: not who owns the news, but what a government charges a platform for not paying for it, and what has, and has not, happened since the charge became law.

Fig. 01 / Designed to raise nothing, repriced on the way to law
  1. December 2024
    12 DecemberThe News Bargaining Incentive is announced, to reach platforms that withdrew news
  2. November 2025
    Day not givenTreasury: the government will collect no revenue from it. Proposed rate 2.25 per cent
  3. August 2026
    3 AugustReporting on the government's position: the looser levy would still raise a similar amount
    13 AugustIntroduced at 2.5 per cent; a full offset needs deals with six publishers
    19 AugustHouse amendment raises the rate to 2.75 per cent, on or about this day, by Senator Henderson's account
    20 AugustAll five bills pass both Houses
    26 AugustRoyal Assent: the rate has risen twice, and a full offset now needs eight publishers

In date order. Spacing is not to scale.

Stated in: the opening, §02, §05, §03

Fig. 01Source: the article text, each mark cited to its sentenceAs of 2026‑09Hand-curated

01A gap built to be closed

Australia already had a mechanism for this problem, and its limits were well understood before the new scheme was drafted. The News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code commenced on 3 March 2021. It produced deals: the code's own 2022 review counted more than 30 commercial agreements between Google, Meta and Australian news businesses. Treasury's November 2025 consultation paper puts the reported total annual value of those deals, historically, at $200 million to $250 million a year, of which Meta's own deals were estimated at around $70 million. Treasury notes the figure could not be verified because of strict non-disclosure clauses in the deals themselves, and that it had not received anything to indicate the estimate was inaccurate.

That figure describes what the 2021 code delivered while platforms were still striking deals under it. It is not a projection of what the News Bargaining Incentive itself will raise, and this desk does not use it as one.

3 March 2021
When the 2021 code commenced. It could apply only to a digital platform that carried news on its service; a platform that withdrew news entirely sat outside its reach entirely, which is the specific gap the incentive was built to close.
Source · Treasury, News Bargaining Incentive: Consultation paper, November 2025 [1]

Against that backdrop, the incentive's own stated aim was narrow and, on its face, modest. Treasury's consultation paper is explicit about what the scheme was meant to achieve for the public purse.

$0
The government's stated collection target for the scheme as designed. Treasury's November 2025 consultation paper states: "The intention of the News Bargaining Incentive (the incentive) is that the Government will collect no revenue from it." A platform that does enough of the right deals owes nothing.
Source · Treasury, November 2025 [1]

02The rate that climbed twice, and the base that narrowed

Treasury's initial modelling, published in the November 2025 consultation paper, proposed a $250 million Australian-revenue threshold and, contingent on a 150 per cent deduction rate, an incentive rate of 2.25 per cent, set so as to "incentivise deals equivalent to 1.5 per cent of revenue". At exposure-draft stage, across three bills, the charge (referred to throughout as the "NMI") was set at that same 2.25 per cent, imposed on a service group's consolidated revenue attributable to Australia where that revenue exceeded $250 million and the group ran a "significant" social media service (more than 5 million average monthly active Australian users) or search service (more than 10 million).

By the time the bill reached Parliament, both the rate and the base had moved. As introduced on 13 August 2026, the design was reported as "Finalized" at 2.5 per cent of Australian digital advertising revenue only, a considerably narrower base than the exposure draft's broad consolidated-revenue test. The final Act keeps that narrower base: the threshold as enacted is total relevant Australian digital advertising revenue exceeding A$250 million for a group's 12-month financial reporting period, not the broader consolidated-revenue figure the exposure draft had used.

The rate rose again after introduction, and this is where the record gets thin. In the Senate on 20 August 2026, Coalition Senator Sarah Henderson said the original 2.5 per cent design had been raised to 2.75 per cent by a House amendment the previous day, on or about 19 August 2026, which the Coalition agreed to. This desk tried to open Parliament's own Bills Digest, the bill's status page, and Hansard for the House debate on 18 and 19 August directly; all three routes returned access errors. Neither the amendment's mover nor any recorded vote count could be confirmed from a primary source. What is confirmed, from Henderson's own account and corroborated independently by a KPMG tax alert published after assent, is the rate itself.

2.75%
The incentive rate at Royal Assent: total relevant Australian digital advertising revenue exceeding A$250 million for a group's 12-month financial reporting period, applying from the 2025-26 financial year onward.
Source · KPMG, September 2026 [5]
SettingNov 2025 designExposure draftAs introduced, 13 Aug 2026At Royal Assent, 26 Aug 2026
Incentive rate2.25%2.25%2.5%2.75%
Deals needed for a full offsetn/aFour news business groupsSix publishersEight news business groups

A third setting moved alongside the rate. The exposure draft's uplift multiplier, for deals with small or medium news businesses, was 170 per cent (150 per cent for other groups); by the time the bill was introduced it had already reached 200 per cent for small and medium businesses, and the final Act keeps it there, at 200 per cent against 150 per cent for larger groups. Two figures, across three dates: the uplift moved from 170 per cent at design stage to 200 per cent as introduced, and stayed at 200 per cent through to the Act.

03What the industry got changed

The final legislative package grew from three bills at exposure draft to five as introduced: the News Media Bargaining Charge Bill 2026, the News Media Bargaining (Administration) Bill 2026, the Treasury Laws Amendment (News Media Bargaining) (Consequential) Bill 2026, the News Journalism Payments Bill 2026, and the News Journalism Payments (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2026. All five passed both Houses on 20 August 2026 and received Royal Assent on 26 August 2026. The Administration Bill commences the day after assent, which puts commencement at 27 August 2026.

Mediaweek reported on 12 August 2026, the day before the bill's introduction, that three settings had been relaxed after News Corp and Nine Entertainment Co warned the original design would cut payments to larger newsrooms: the number of publisher deals required for a full offset, the cap on how much of a platform's liability any single deal could offset, and the revenue look-back period used to calculate liability. As introduced on 13 August 2026, the bill required deals with six publishers; the Act as finally passed required eight.

25%
The cap, as enacted, on how much of a platform's total levy liability a single publisher deal can offset. It had been cut to 16 per cent at an earlier stage of the bill's life; industry warning that the tighter figure would reduce payments to larger newsrooms saw it restored to a quarter before passage.
Source · Mediaweek, 12 August 2026 [7]; Sarah Henderson, 20 August 2026 [6]

The government's own account of the scheme's purpose, through this whole process, stayed consistent even as the numbers moved under it.

A diverse, strong and sustainable media sector is an essential part of a robust democracy.

That is Assistant Treasurer Daniel Mulino, on the record, defending a scheme whose settings his own government was simultaneously renegotiating with the industry it was meant to help. Both things can be true at once: a stated purpose that does not change, and a mechanism that does, three times, in the space of nine months.

04Who pays, and what is carved out

The platforms named as caught by the charge are Google (Alphabet), Meta (Facebook and Instagram), TikTok (ByteDance), and LinkedIn (Microsoft). The Canberra Times reported on 3 August 2026 that these four platforms were named as caught by the charge, whether or not they carry Australian news.

One category of service is carved out by name: TheNextWeb reported on 20 August 2026 that AI companies remain excluded from the legislation despite training on and summarising the journalism it is meant to fund. The exposure draft's Explanatory Memorandum excludes AI and large-language-model-only services from the definition of a "search service", the category that would otherwise bring a platform into scope.

“Services provided solely or primarily by large language models are excluded from the definition of internet search engine service. Accordingly, an artificial intelligence service which solely uses a large language model to provide answers to questions or other information would not satisfy the definition of an internet search engine service.”

Exposure Draft Explanatory Memorandum · The Treasury / Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2025 to 2026 [2]
Zero
The charge on a service that answers questions using only a large language model, under the exposure draft's drafting. AI companies remain outside the scope of the enacted law despite training on, and summarising, the journalism the scheme is meant to fund, as TheNextWeb reported on 20 August 2026.
Source · Exposure Draft Explanatory Memorandum [2]; TheNextWeb, 20 August 2026 [9]

A charge built around a search engine's user count and a social media platform's active-user threshold was never going to reach a chatbot answering a question directly. In the sources opened on 9 September 2026, none suggested that gap has been revisited since assent.

05A promise to return it, and a promise to still raise it

The scheme's design intent, stated by Treasury in November 2025, was for the government to collect no net revenue from the charge at all. Its introduction-day framing, on 13 August 2026, was consistent with that: the government's stated position was that any revenue collected would be returned in full to the Australian news sector through a new News Journalism Payment Scheme, not retained as general revenue. The distribution formula announced that day weights payments by journalist employment, with a 20 per cent loading for regional journalists and small outlets, 5 per cent directed to the Australian Associated Press, and a further 5 per cent for small publisher grants.

The joint media release announcing the bills' introduction, issued by the Hon Anika Wells MP, Minister for Communications, and Dr Daniel Mulino MP, Assistant Treasurer, named no charge rate, no threshold and no dollar figure. Both ministers have separately put the scheme's purpose in their own words: Mulino, that the arrangements are "appropriate and consistent with all of our obligations"; Wells, that the government wants "new journalists" and "innovators in this space", and an incentive "for that to continue, not to diminish".

5%
The share of any money raised through the scheme directed to the Australian Associated Press. Separately, the May 2026 Budget committed a $15 million top-up to AAP, bringing its total federal funding for 2026-27 to $26 million, and allocated a further $21.4 million to the local news industry more broadly. Both Budget figures are separate from, and much smaller than, any estimate of what the charge itself might raise; this desk did not conflate the two.
Source · Mediaweek, 12 August 2026 [7]; Mumbrella, 13 May 2026 [13]; Mediaweek, 13 May 2026 [12]

That is the design as stated. The framing shifted before the ink was dry on it. By 3 August 2026, ahead of the bill's introduction, reporting on the government's own position described the revised, looser levy as expected to "still raise a similar amount" to the original, tighter design, though no specific dollar figure appeared in that reporting. Communications Minister Anika Wells was quoted in the same coverage on a related point: that "an important change is the doubling of the distribution loading for smaller and regional publishers."

This desk tried to find a primary document that puts a number on either side of that sentence: what the charge is expected to raise, and what is expected to reach the news sector once deals and offsets are accounted for. The Treasury Ministers' own media release gave no figure. The Exposure Draft Explanatory Memorandum's financial impact material did not resolve it. Budget Paper No. 2 for 2026-27 was retrieved but could not be searched down to the specific measure within the scope of this research. No other primary document surfaced one either. What is confirmed, and what this article rests on instead, is the shape of the shift: a scheme designed to collect nothing, promising in the same breath to return everything it does collect, moving within weeks to a government description of itself as still likely to raise a similar amount regardless of how much its own settings had been loosened.

06The pushback, and what hasn't happened since

Meta's formal submission to government, made during the consultation period and quoted in trade press on 4 June 2026, opposed the scheme in direct terms.

“It is not the role of digital platforms to pay to rescue public-interest journalism.”

Meta, submission to government · B&T, 4 June 2026 [14]

Meta's submission went further, arguing that the fact a platform can remove news content from its services at all "is itself evidence that news has negligible commercial value to our platforms", and that the charge "operates as a tax on innovation rather than a targeted response to any identified market failure". Every one of those quotes is dated 4 June 2026, more than two months before the 19 August House amendment and the 26 August assent. No Meta statement dated after assent was found for this article, so these should be read as Meta's reaction to an earlier draft, not to the law as it now stands. Separately, and reported rather than quoted directly from Meta itself, Meta has argued the charge breaches the Australia-United States free trade agreement.

Not every part of the media industry took Meta's position. On 28 April 2026, eight Australian media organisations, the ABC, News Corp Australasia, Network Ten, Southern Cross Media Group, Australian Community Media, Nine Entertainment Co, SBS, and The Guardian Australia, issued a joint statement endorsing the then-draft legislation. Their statement noted that Meta "has not engaged since withdrawing from previous deals nearly 18 months prior", while separately acknowledging "Google's positive approach", and called on all platforms to participate.

The pushback did not stay domestic. On 1 September 2026, eight members of the United States House of Representatives, Carol D. Miller, Beth Van Duyne, Aaron Bean, Rudy Yakym III, Randy Feenstra, Claudia Tenney, Scott Fitzgerald, and Darin LaHood, signed a letter to United States Trade Representative Jamieson Greer calling for a Section 301 investigation into the scheme. This desk's account of that letter comes from Americans for Tax Reform, a US anti-tax advocacy organisation, which published its own report of the letter on 3 September 2026; the letter itself was not opened for this article, so its exact wording should be treated as unverified.

As at 9 September 2026, this desk found no report of any new or renewed commercial deal between a covered platform and an Australian news business since the 26 August 2026 assent, and no report of any covered platform announcing an intention to withdraw news from Australia since assent either. Neither absence is proof that no deal or no withdrawal exists, only that none surfaced in the sources opened for this research, conducted two weeks after the law took effect. A scheme built to be worth nothing to a platform that does enough deals has, so far, produced no confirmed deal for anyone to check.

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From the desk
  • 30 November 2026Watch
    Watch: three months after the News Bargaining Incentive commenced
    Media Ownership
    Read the desk note

    Check for any platform deal or withdrawal notice announced since the 26 August 2026 assent; any ATO or ACCC guidance published on the charge; any US Trade Representative action on the 1 September 2026 congressional letter to Jamieson Greer; and whether any primary document (Budget Paper, Portfolio Budget Statement, or Parliamentary Budget Office costing) now states a revenue estimate for the scheme. Three months after the 27 August 2026 commencement is the desk's reading for when a first deal, guidance note, or trade response would plausibly surface.

  • 9 September 2026Record
    Record: the News Bargaining Incentive written as a postscript to the media ownership series, re-angled from an unverifiable revenue figure to the scheme's own moving settings
    Media Ownership · attended 9 September 2026
    Read the desk note

    ATTENDED 9 September 2026 (audit item: media bargaining incentive, no date).

    FINDING. The desk's original brief framed this article around a $500 million Treasury revenue figure and a $200 to $250 million estimate of what would reach media outlets under the final scheme. Neither figure could be verified in any primary document opened during research: not the Treasury Ministers' 13 August 2026 media release, not the Exposure Draft Explanatory Memorandum, and not Budget Paper No. 2 2026-27 itself, which could not be searched down to the relevant measure. The only primary-sourced $200 to $250 million figure describes the historical annual value of pre-existing 2021-code deals, not a forward estimate under the new charge, and it is dated to Treasury's November 2025 consultation paper. Both figures were dropped from the article. What is confirmed instead is a real, sourced paradox: the scheme's own design intent, stated by Treasury in November 2025, was for the government to collect no net revenue at all; the government's own introduction-day framing on 13 August 2026 was that any revenue collected would be returned in full to the news sector; and by early August, reporting on the government's position had the revised levy still expected to raise a similar amount to the original design, without giving a figure. The rate itself took three values (2.25 per cent in the November 2025 design, 2.5 per cent as introduced on 13 August 2026, 2.75 per cent by a House amendment on or about 19 August 2026), the number of publisher deals needed for a full offset also took three values, four, then six, then eight, and the cap on any one deal's share of the offset was cut to 16 per cent and then restored to 25 per cent after News Corp and Nine Entertainment Co warned the tighter design would cut payments to larger newsrooms.

    ARTICLE CHANGES. Article 7 of the media ownership series, 'The levy that was designed to raise nothing', published as a postscript, not a renumbering of the closed series. Three entities added to the registry: Meta, Google, and the News Bargaining Incentive itself as a mechanism.

    STILL OPEN: the Act numbers for any of the five statutes; the identity of the MP who moved the 19 August 2026 House amendment and any recorded division; a primary-sourced Budget revenue estimate for the charge; any commercial deal or withdrawal notice since the 26 August 2026 assent; and any US Trade Representative response to the 1 September 2026 congressional letter.

    NEXT DATE: 30 November 2026, three months after commencement.

The desk record →
THE RORT STANDARD 1.0: published before 1.0, not yet reviewed
This piece was published before the standard took effect on 8 Oct 2026 and has not been reviewed against it. What follows is what its own data records, not a finding that it meets the standard.
RS-1 3 of 16 references are primary documents (Tier 1). Enforced on new pieces by the release gate (RS-1.1) and the desk record.
RS-2 16 references: resolves checked 0, exists confirmed 0, supports confirmed 0, the rest unchecked. Enforced on new pieces by the release gate (RS-2.1) and the desk record.
RS-3 No counter. Enforced by the release gate (RS-3.1 to RS-3.4) and the desk record.
RS-4 Not graded: published before 1.0. Enforced on new pieces by the release gate (RS-4.1 to RS-4.2) and the desk record.
RS-5 Right of reply: not recorded for this article. Enforced on new pieces by the release gate (RS-5.1 to RS-5.8) and the desk record.
RS-6 Unnamed sources not yet declared (published before 1.0). Enforced on new pieces by the release gate (RS-6.1 to RS-6.2) and the desk record.
RS-7 No corrections. Enforced by the release gate (RS-7.1 to RS-7.2) and the desk record.
RS-8 None declared. Enforced by the release gate (RS-8.1) and the desk record.
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RS-11 Complaints: desk@therort.com.au. Factual errors: corrections@therort.com.au. Acknowledged within five business days. Enforced by the release gate (RS-11.1 to RS-11.4) and the desk record.
References & Sources16 sources · all linked
Evidence strength
  • Primary 3
  • Official 3
  • Masthead 2
  • Trade 8
Primary
the document itself: legislation, a court record, a filing, a regulator’s own publication
Official
the organisation’s own statement about itself
Masthead
a news organisation with a corrections policy, reporting the primary document
Trade
specialist or trade press
How sources are graded

A check appears under a source only where one is on record: a machine test of whether the link loads, and, where the desk has made the call, whether the document exists and whether it carries the claim. Nothing is shown for a check that is not on record. What these checks mean

  1. Primaryhttps://storage.googleapis.com/files-au-treasury/treasury/p/prj38f28c23f2accd6993e91/page/c2025_718159.pdf Treasury, 'News Bargaining Incentive: Consultation paper' (November 2025). Supports the announcement date, the zero-net-revenue design intent, the 2021 code's reach and its historical deal value, and the initial rate and threshold modelling.
  2. Primaryhttps://storage.googleapis.com/files-au-treasury/treasury/p/prj3c435c59673ac0d4080cc/page/c2026_763377_em.pdf Exposure Draft Explanatory Memorandum, News Media Bargaining (Administration) Bill 2026 and related bills. Supports the draft-stage rate, threshold and offset design, and the AI/large-language-model exclusion.
  3. Mastheadhttps://www.thedailyaus.com.au/politics/news-bargaining-incentive-03-08-2026 The Daily Aus, 'Tech giants face new News Bargaining Incentive levy' (3 August 2026). Supports the as-introduced design and the 'raise a similar amount' government framing.
  4. Tradehttps://jws.com.au/what-we-think/changes-to-australias-news-media-bargaining-laws/ Johnson Winter Slattery, 'Changes to Australia's news media bargaining laws'. Supports the final five-bill list, the enacted charge base and offset settings, and the commencement rule.
  5. Tradehttps://kpmg.com/us/en/taxnewsflash/news/2026/09/australia-enactment-news-media-bargaining-incentive-law-targeting-large-digital-platforms.html KPMG, 'Australia: Enactment of news media bargaining incentive law targeting large digital platforms' (September 2026). Supports the assent date, the enacted rate and threshold, and the financial-year application.
  6. Officialhttps://sarahhenderson.com.au/news-media-bargaining-administration-bill-2026-second-reading-debate/ Sarah Henderson, second reading debate (20 August 2026). Supports the rate history and the timing of the House amendment.
  7. Tradehttps://www.mediaweek.com.au/labor-retreats-on-tech-levy-after-media-backlash Mediaweek, 'Labor retreats on tech levy after media backlash' (12 August 2026). Supports the cap, publisher-count and look-back changes, the AAP earmark, and Mulino's quote.
  8. Mastheadhttps://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/9322353/tech-giants-to-face-higher-payments-for-news-content/ The Canberra Times, 'Tech giants to face higher payments for news content' (3 August 2026). Supports the platforms named and ministerial quotes.
  9. Tradehttps://thenextweb.com/news/australia-news-bargaining-incentive-passes-parliament TheNextWeb, 'Meta, Google, TikTok, and LinkedIn now face an Australian news law whether they carry news or not' (20 August 2026). Supports the platform list, the AI exclusion and the free trade agreement claim.
  10. Tradehttps://mumbrella.com.au/news-bargaining-incentive-finally-introduced-to-parliament-as-government-reveals-final-scheme-933052 Mumbrella, 'News Bargaining Incentive introduced to Parliament as government reveals final scheme' (13 August 2026). Supports the 'returned in full' distribution promise and its formula.
  11. Primaryhttps://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/daniel-mulino-2025/media-releases/support-australian-journalism-goes-parliament Treasury Ministers, 'Support for Australian journalism goes before the Parliament' (13 August 2026). Supports the joint ministerial announcement and confirms no figures were given in it.
  12. Tradehttps://www.mediaweek.com.au/bc-sbs-and-aap-emerge-as-media-winners-in-2026-federal-budget Mediaweek, 'ABC, SBS and AAP emerge as media winners in 2026 Federal Budget' (13 May 2026). Supports the AAP Budget top-up figure.
  13. Tradehttps://mumbrella.com.au/a-big-impact-budget-how-the-changes-hit-media-and-marketing-923044 Mumbrella, 'A big impact Budget: How the changes hit media and marketing' (13 May 2026). Supports the Budget's local-news funding commitment.
  14. Tradehttps://www.bandt.com.au/not-the-role-of-platforms-to-pay-to-rescue-public-interest-journalism-meta-slams-news-bargaining-incentive/ B&T, Meta submission quotes (4 June 2026). Supports Meta's direct, verbatim opposition to the scheme.
  15. Officialhttps://www.sbs.com.au/aboutus/2026/04/28/joint-statement-news-bargaining-incentive/ SBS, 'Joint Statement: News Bargaining Incentive' (28 April 2026). Supports the eight-organisation industry coalition and its account of Meta and Google.
  16. Officialhttps://atr.org/u-s-representatives-call-for-action-against-australias-news-bargaining-incentive Americans for Tax Reform, 'U.S. Representatives Call for Action Against Australia's News Bargaining Incentive' (3 September 2026). Supports the 1 September 2026 congressional letter to the USTR.
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