What would fix it

Article 1 of this series established the foundational fact: when a third carrier enters an Australian domestic route, the price per kilometre falls by more than half. ¹ The government's own competition taskforce documented this. ¹ It is not disputed. ¹

The reforms that would lower fares are therefore reforms that create the conditions for a third carrier to exist and compete, or that constrain the pricing power of airports and dominant airlines in the absence of competition. [1,7] They are documented. They are costed. Most of them have been recommended by the ACCC or the Senate or both. [6,9] What they have not been is implemented. ⁷

This article examines each major reform category, what it would do, what is already in motion, and what the political obstacle is. [1,6,7,9]

01Reform 1: Fifth freedom rights and bilateral air services liberalisation

The most effective near-term reform for international routes is the one at the centre of the Qatar block story: granting international carriers fifth freedom rights, the ability to pick up and set down passengers between Australian cities on international routes. [5,9]

Qatar Airways wanted to fly Doha-Sydney-Melbourne-Doha. Under fifth freedom rights, it would also have been able to carry passengers from Sydney to Melbourne on that leg, not just international travellers beginning their journey in Doha. ⁹ This is how Dubai and Singapore have built aviation hubs: by allowing fifth freedom flying, they created markets where multiple carriers compete on each route, driving prices down systematically. ⁵

The European Union's answer to this question, its Single Aviation Market established in 1993, granted these rights between all EU member states simultaneously. ⁵ The result was the emergence of Ryanair and easyJet as transformative competitive forces. ⁵ European domestic airfares, adjusted for distance, are consistently lower than Australian equivalents. ⁵

Australia's bilateral air service agreements are restrictive on fifth freedom rights compared to open skies models. ⁹ The Senate inquiry recommended the government conduct proper cost-benefit analysis before bilateral decisions, consult the ACCC, and publish its reasons. ⁹ These recommendations have not been implemented in any enforceable form. ⁹

The Qatar-Virgin alliance, authorised by the ACCC in March 2025, is a partial implementation of the competition that fifth freedom rights would have created directly. [3,12] Virgin CEO confirmed at the alliance authorisation that competition was already producing 'increased sale activity on airfares between Australia and Europe, the Middle East and Africa.' [3,12] The evidence is live: competition lowers prices. [1,12]

Correction, 8 October 2026. The fact box in this section and the key facts gave a range as the estimated cost of 20 months of foregone Qatar competition, with a low end of A$540M a year. The range was presented as the ACCI's estimate of the cost of the block, as the series' article 3 gave it, and its low end is not in the source that article cites ³. The ACCI's estimate, as Al Jazeera reports it, is one figure: at least A$788 million a year in lost tourism, a cost to the Australian economy, not a measure of the cost of lost competition. The fact box and the key facts now say so. See the correction of the same date on The Qatar block.

02Reform 2: Slot management and use-it-or-lose-it enforcement

The replacement of the Qantas-Virgin joint venture slot manager at Sydney Airport with the independent Airport Coordination Limited in April 2025 is the most significant structural aviation reform of recent years. ² It addresses one of the five structural barriers to entry identified in Article 2. ²

Under ACL's management, airlines face stricter use-it-or-lose-it enforcement, real-time slot usage tracking, and published slot data. ² If an airline cannot use its peak-hour slots at the level of utilisation expected at comparable international airports, it risks losing them. ² This creates genuine space for new entrants to access Sydney's most valuable flying windows. ²

What remains insufficient: the 80/20 rule, which allows cancellation of 20 per cent of flights without forfeiting slots, was retained in the 2024 reforms. [17,18] Sydney Airport itself had urged a much stricter 95/5 rule, under which an airline must use a slot at least 95 per cent of the time to keep it. ¹⁹ The reform is genuine. The implementation is conservative. ²

This outlet's recommendation: the government should tighten the 80/20 rule toward the 95/5 standard Sydney Airport has itself proposed ¹⁹, with independent ACCC review of whether slot reallocation is producing measurable new entry.

Correction, 7 October 2026. This section said aviation analysts argued for a stricter 85/15 or 90/10 slot rule; no source for those figures could be found, and the reference cited did not carry them. It now reports the documented proposal: Sydney Airport's call for a 95/5 rule. ¹⁹ The retention of the 80/20 rule in the 2024 reforms is now cited to the Parliamentary Library Bills Digest and Australian Aviation. [17,18]

Correction, 8 October 2026. The recommendation in this section called for moving the 80/20 rule to 85/15 within two years, citing references 2 and 6, which carry no such figure. It is now marked as this outlet's own recommendation, points to the 95/5 rule Sydney Airport proposed ¹⁹ instead of an unsourced 85/15 figure, and no longer carries a two-year deadline or the citations that did not support it.

03Reform 3: Airport re-regulation

The ACCC has recommended mandatory and enforceable aeronautical pricing principles for more than a decade. ⁶ Former ACCC chair Allan Fels identified a 'very strong case' for price regulation. ⁶ Airlines for Australia and New Zealand called the current monitoring regime 'not fit for purpose.' ⁶ The airports earned EBITDA margins of up to 82 per cent and returns on aeronautical assets above 20 per cent. ⁶

The ACCC's March 2026 airport monitoring report warned that A$20 billion in planned infrastructure investment would likely produce higher charges flowing through to passengers. ⁶ It recommended, again, that pricing principles be made mandatory and that dispute resolution mechanisms be introduced. ⁶

What this means in practice: when an airport proposes to charge airlines A$X per landing, airlines should have access to an independent arbitration process rather than simply accepting the airport's terms or withdrawing from the airport entirely. ⁶ This is how the UK's Competition and Markets Authority regulates Heathrow. ⁵ It is not radical. It is standard. ⁶

The Western Sydney International Airport, opening late 2026 as a fully government-owned facility, represents an opportunity. ¹⁴ Its slot allocation, pricing structure, and access rules can be designed without the influence of the incumbents. ¹⁴ If designed correctly, with competitive access principles, slot allocation favouring new entrants, and pricing regulated from the start, WSI could be the entry point that changes the structural dynamic in Australian aviation. ¹⁴

04Reform 4: Transparency and competition powers

The Senate inquiry's most structurally significant recommendation, largely overlooked, was the call for divestiture powers. ⁴

Former ACCC chair Allan Fels told the inquiry he was 'strongly in favour' of giving the ACCC power to require Qantas to divest Jetstar. ⁴

The logic: Jetstar is the mechanism through which Qantas occupies both the premium and budget segments of the domestic market simultaneously. [4,7] A standalone Jetstar, competing independently for passengers and no longer able to coordinate with Qantas on capacity decisions, would immediately restructure the domestic market. ⁴ The threat of divestiture, even if never exercised, would change the incentives of both airlines. ⁴

A specific ACCC investigation into Qantas's market conduct, as recommended by the Senate inquiry, would create the evidentiary basis for whatever structural intervention the market ultimately requires. ⁴ The monitoring direction that the Treasurer issued in 2023 runs only to December 2026. ⁷ It should be made permanent. ⁷

05Reform 5: Political integrity

This reform category is the one the major parties have consistently refused to consider. ⁸

The Chairman's Lounge model, documented in Article 4, works because it is legal. ⁸ Upgrades are declared. No law is broken. ⁸ The system produces a structurally corrupted decision-making environment without requiring any individual act of corruption. ⁸

The fix is simple: prohibit politicians and ministers from accepting any benefits from regulated industries above standard commercial entitlements. ⁸ An economy-class seat from Qantas, booked and paid for normally, is a standard commercial entitlement. ⁸ A Chairman's Lounge membership, a personal relationship with the CEO, and a guaranteed upgrade whenever the minister chooses to fly is not. ⁸

Every time crossbench senators moved on this, the major parties voted it down. ⁸

More broadly: bilateral air service decisions should be subject to mandatory cost-benefit analysis, ACCC consultation, and publication of reasons, as the Senate recommended. ⁹ The Qatar block occurred because none of these requirements existed. ⁹ A future transport minister should not be able to block a competitor's application, on behalf of a dominant incumbent, without any of these requirements applying. ⁹

The Qantas-Virgin JV managed Sydney Airport's slots from 1997 to 2025. The Prime Minister whose government blocked Qatar in 2023 had declared upgrades on about 22 personal Qantas flights. The ACCC has recommended airport price regulation for over a decade. None of this required any law to be broken. Fixing it requires laws, not just better behaviour.

06What is already working

It is worth recording what has already changed, because reform is possible and some of it has happened. [2,3,7]

Independent slot management at Sydney Airport from April 2025: a genuine structural reform. ²

Qatar-Virgin alliance producing immediate fare competition on Australia-Europe routes from June 2025. [3,12]

ACCC monitoring direction extended and quarterly reporting recommenced. ⁷

Aviation White Paper published, flagging further competition and consumer protection work. ⁷

Western Sydney International Airport under construction, government-owned, opening late 2026. ¹⁴

Aviation Customer Rights Charter introduced: partial consumer protection. ¹⁰

Each of these is genuine. [2,3,7,14] None is sufficient on its own. [1,7] The structural condition documented across this series, a duopoly on almost 99 per cent of domestic flights, 16.1 per cent domestic margins, record profits, fares above pre-COVID levels, has not changed. ⁷

Correction, 7 October 2026. This section, and the key facts, said the two airline groups hold 94 to 99 per cent of the domestic market. The ACCC figure this article cites ⁷ is nearly 99 per cent of domestic flights. Both now say almost 99 per cent.

07The political obstacle

The case for reform is clear. The reforms are known. The evidence is documented. The ACCC has made the recommendations. The Senate has supported them. [1,4,6,9]

The obstacle is the same mechanism this series has documented across eight articles: an airline that has systematically cultivated relationships with the politicians who make regulatory decisions, through a legal system of access and preferential treatment that creates obligation without corruption. [8,15]

Qantas has every incentive to maintain the current architecture. ¹⁵ Its domestic margins are 16.1 per cent in a concentrated market. ¹⁵ Its Loyalty division generates A$511 million in EBIT on a business that depends on domestic pricing power. ¹⁵ Every structural reform that introduces competition reduces those margins. [1,15]

The political economy of reform is therefore asymmetric. ¹⁵ The benefits are diffuse, distributed across 25 million Australians in the form of lower fares. ¹ The costs are concentrated, absorbed by Qantas's shareholders and executives. ¹⁵ Concentrated interests are better organised to resist reform than diffuse interests are to demand it. ¹⁵

This series has been an attempt to change that. ¹ The facts of the airline rort are not complicated. The market is concentrated. The profits are high. The competition was blocked. The Prime Minister whose government blocked it had declared upgrades on about 22 personal Qantas flights between 2009 and 2019. ¹⁶ The man who lobbied for the block left the country and was never questioned. The media that should have covered the structural story had commercial relationships with the airline. [1,7,8,15]

Correction, 7 October 2026. This article said, in this paragraph, in a pull quote and in its key facts, that the transport minister who blocked Qatar Airways' application in 2023 had received 22 or more Qantas upgrades. No source this series cites supports that. The figure of about 22 declared personal upgrades, between 2009 and 2019, belongs to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, as the series' own article on Qantas and the politicians records. ¹⁶ All three passages now say so.

The fix is: more competitors, better regulated airports, constrained ministerial discretion, banned industry gifts to politicians. [1,6,8,9] Australia has the evidence. It has the recommendations. It has an independent regulator that has been making the case for two decades. ⁶

What it needs is a government that will act on it.

08The Airline Rort: series complete

If it's a rort, we cover it.

Update, 7 October 2026. Reference ¹¹, which pointed to the ACCC's homepage, now points to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources page that describes the Australian Domestic Gas Security Mechanism, the agency that administers it. No sentence in this article cites it.